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INTRODUCTION
A common assumption is that children adjudicated delinquent continue
into adulthood unencumbered by their childhood encounters with the juvenile
justice system. Yet, increasingly punitive consequences collateral to an
adjudication of delinquency ensure that their youthful indiscretions follow them
well into their adult lives and the offenders remain largely uninformed about the
consequences of their adjudications. Oblivious to the potential consequences,
they are encouraged to enter admissions or guilty pleas.
Collateral consequences1 hinder a juvenile's successful reintegration into
society, impeding, for example, his or her ability to pursue education and obtain
housing2 or employment. An increasing number of college and financial aid
applications inquire about juvenile adjudications3 and certain drug offenses can
disqualify an individual for financial aid.4 Increasingly, employment applications
inquire into juvenile adjudications as well as adult criminal convictions.5 An
adjudication of delinquency may also hinder plans to enlist in the military.6
While each division of the military has distinct regulations governing the use of
juvenile delinquency and criminal records, no division explicitly prohibits the
consideration of such records.7
In addition to creating barriers to future success, juvenile adjudications can
also restrict a youth's current livelihood. For example, as a consequence of an
adjudication some courts can suspend or revoke a juvenile's driver's license for
certain acts.8 For juveniles who reside in rural communities where there is
limited, if any, public transportation, the inability to drive may translate into an
1. This article will not provide a comprehensive list of consequences collateral to a juvenile
adjudication of delinquency.
2. See HUD v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002); see also 42 U.S.C. § 13663; see, e.g., CHICAGO, ILL.
MUN. CODE tit. 8, ch. 4, § 090 (2005) (ordinance on “drug and gang houses, houses of prostitution and
other disorderly houses” that is used routinely to impose fines, eviction orders, or even forfeiture of
private property based on criminal or delinquent activity of occupants).
3. See Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Collateral Consequences of Juvenile Proceedings: Part II, 15 CRIM.
JUST. MAG. 41, 42 (2000) (discussing the use of juvenile adjudications in obtaining education or
employment).
4. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C.A. § 1091(r) (West 2010); see DEP’T OF EDUC., STUDENT AID REPORT: STUDENT
AID ELIGIBILITY WORKSHEET FOR QUESTION 23 (2010), available at http://www.ifap.ed.gov/
drugworksheets/attachments/0107091011Drug%20WorksheetFINAL.pdf.
5. See Shepherd, supra note 3, at 42.
6. See ARMY. R. 601-210, 4–24 (2008); Air Force Instruction 36-2002, at 31 (1999), available at
http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/shared/media/epubs/AFI36-2911.pdf; Navy Recruiting ManualEnlisted 2-95-2-98 (2002), available at http://usmilitary.about.com/library/pdf/navrecruit.pdf; 2
Military Personnel Procurement Manual, MCO P1100, 72C 3-95-3-105 (2004), available at
http://www.marines.mil/news/
publications/Documents/MCO%20P1100.72C%20W%20ERRATUM.pdf.
7. See id.
8. See, e.g., 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1532(c)(1) (West 2006) (stating that in Pennsylvania,
juvenile adjudications can result in suspension or revocation of driving privileges); 75 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 1532(a)(1) (West 2006) (stating that when a juvenile has been adjudicated of a felony
offense where a vehicle was “essentially involved,” his or her driver’s license may be suspended for
one year).
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inability to work. Adjudications of delinquency may also make youth ineligible
for public benefits, including Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
and food stamps.9
Finally, delinquency adjudications can carry very serious consequences that
manifest in the future. For example, some states require juveniles adjudicated of
sex offenses to register on a public registry of sex offenders. Other states permit
involuntary commitment of individuals adjudicated delinquent on sex offenses
after they have reached the age of majority.10 Certain convictions can result in
severe immigration consequences as well.11
Despite the severity of these penalties, courts have categorized collateral
consequences as "non-punitive" or "civil," and therefore outside the scope of
what competent attorneys must advise their clients about in criminal and
juvenile delinquency cases. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on a
failure to warn clients of the collateral consequences of a conviction have largely
been unsuccessful. However, the United States Supreme Court's recent decision
in Padilla v. Kentucky,12 establishing an obligation for counsel to advise clients of
the immigration consequences of a guilty plea, has opened the door for new
argument on this issue.
Applying the logic underpinning the United States Supreme Court's
holding in Padilla v. Kentucky, we explore the role of defense attorneys in
communicating collateral consequences of adjudications to juveniles prior to
entering into plea agreements. This article focuses particularly on cases where
severe consequences attach. We argue that this communication is particularly
important for youth, and that failure to inform juvenile clients can and should
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, and we propose solutions to
overcoming the practical obstacles to fully informing juvenile clients. Part I
explains that the need to communicate collateral consequences to juveniles is
particularly important—even more so than in an adult criminal context—given at
least three factors: (1) the shift from a rehabilitative to a punitive juvenile court
system, (2) prevailing standards of practice on advising criminal and juvenile
defendants of collateral consequences, and (3) the overwhelming body of
research on adolescent development that finds youth less competent than their
adult counterparts and unable to fully participate in their own plea-bargaining.
Part II reconsiders, in light of Padilla, the strength of the ineffective assistance of
counsel argument in cases in which serious collateral consequences attach to
adjudications. We explore the duty to advise clients of consequences of juvenile
sex offenses, including sex offender registration and notification and involuntary
civil commitment, and demonstrate how failure to inform can be deemed
deficient representation. Part III argues for an affirmative responsibility on
attorneys and judges to meaningfully inform youth of collateral consequences,
including those that may not actualize until the juvenile has long been
discharged from court supervision. Finally, we note the obstacles to
9. Federal Welfare Reform Law, Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996, § 115, 21 U.S.C.A. § 862a (West 2000 & Supp. 2010).
10. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.025 (West 2008); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6401
(West Supp. 2010).
11. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b) (2006).
12. 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010).
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communicating collateral consequences to juvenile clients as well as propose
practical solutions to better inform youth of collateral consequences.
PADILLA V. KENTUCKY
Jose Padilla was a lawful permanent resident of the United States for more
than forty years when he pled guilty to drug-distribution charges for
transporting a large amount of marijuana.13 In post-conviction proceedings,
Padilla claimed that he entered a guilty plea on the advice of his attorney and
that his attorney failed to warn him that his conviction could result in his
deportation.14 Padilla's trial counsel had told him he "'did not need to worry
about deportation because he had lived in the U.S. for so long,'" although
deportation was a "virtually mandatory" consequence of a guilty conviction for
his charge.15 The Kentucky Supreme Court held that Padilla's attorney's failure to
advise him that he would be deported did not constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel because deportation was a collateral consequence of conviction.16 The
United States Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the Sixth Amendment
requires counsel to provide affirmative, competent advice to non-citizen clients
on the immigration consequences of guilty pleas.17 Thus, Padilla's attorney's
failure to inform him of the deportation consequence was ineffective assistance
of counsel.18
In support of its holding in Padilla, the Court reasoned that the changes in
immigration law have "raised the stakes of a noncitizen's criminal conviction,"
and despite the complexity of immigration law, counsel was still required to
communicate the deportation consequences to his client prior to entering a
plea.19 Moreover, standards of practice and professional norms support
informing criminal defendants of the consequences of their convictions.20 Given
the foregoing reasoning, the Court found that the conduct of Padilla's attorney
was deficient, satisfying the first prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel
standard under Strickland v. Washington.21 The Court specified that where the
consequences are unclear, counsel only had a duty to advise his or her client that
there may be adverse immigration consequences.22 However, as was the case
here, the relevant immigration statutes clearly and explicitly state the
consequences of a guilty plea, counsel has a duty to inform clients of these
consequences.23 Silence on the potential consequences is unacceptable.24
13. Id. at 1475.
14. Id. at 1478. The Court addressed this issue, but held that it was not merely the “affirmative
misadvice,” but also the omission of information that rendered counsel ineffective. Id. at 1484.
15. Id. at 1478.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1486.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1480.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1483. The case was remanded to Kentucky Supreme Court to determine whether
Padilla could show prejudice.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1483–84.
24. Id.
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The Court also explored the collateral versus direct distinction identified by
the Kentucky Supreme Court in reaching its conclusion.25 This classification has
been determinative in much of the case law on collateral consequences.26 The
Supreme Court noted that it had never before applied this distinction to define
reasonable performance when determining ineffective assistance, and declined to
do so in Padilla.27 The Court reasoned that deportation is a civil rather than a
criminal penalty, as it is both especially severe and "intimately related to the
criminal process."28 Given that current immigration law makes deportation
essentially automatic for a wide range of offenses, the Court explained that it was
unable to separate the penalty of deportation from the underlying conviction,
noting that the collateral versus direct distinction is "ill-suited" to evaluating an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim in this context.29 With this assessment, the
Court exposed the illogic of the collateral versus direct distinction and
diminished its importance for subsequent case law on this issue.30
The Court's reasoning in Padilla instructs that an attorney has a duty to
inform clients of collateral consequences, particularly when the clients are
juveniles who lack the ability to make informed decisions about entering a plea
that will impose lifelong collateral consequences. Specifically, the Court's
reasoning in Padilla can extend to require attorneys to advise juveniles of the
direct and collateral consequences of their adjudications, especially severe and
automatic consequences such as sex offender registration and notification and
civil commitment.
I.
A.

THE DUTY TO INFORM

The juvenile justice system has dramatically changed from a largely rehabilitative
to more punitive system over time.

In Padilla, the Court stated that immigration law had changed dramatically
over the last ninety years with increased punitive consequences and a broader
class of deportable offenses.31 The Court further stated that "[t]he importance of
accurate legal advice for noncitizens accused of crimes has never been more
important."32

25. Id. at 1482. The Kentucky Supreme Court found that, “collateral consequences are outside the
scope of representation required by the Sixth Amendment,” and, therefore, the “failure of defense
counsel to advise the defendant of possible deportation consequences is not cognizable as a claim for
ineffective assistance of counsel.” Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008) (citing
Commonwealth v. Fuartado, 170 S.W.3d 384 (2005)).
26. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480, n. 8 (“The disagreement over how to apply the direct/collateral
distinction has no bearing on the disposition of this case because, as even Justice Alito agrees, counsel
must, at the very least, advise a noncitizen ‘defendant that a criminal conviction may have adverse
immigration consequences.’”); see also Jenny Roberts, Ignorance is Effectively Bliss: Collateral
Consequences, Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119, 124 (2009).
27. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1481–82.
30. Id. at 1482.
31. Id. at 1478.
32. Id. at 1480.
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Similarly, the juvenile justice system has undergone a shift during the
course of its history and currently is a far more punitive system than originally
imagined. First established over a century ago, the juvenile court's original
purpose was to treat children in a benign, non-punitive, and therapeutic manner
in order to “cure” a child's delinquent behavior.33 This purpose was premised on
the fundamental recognition that children required different treatment from
adults.34 The State assumed the role of parens patriae and characterized its
intervention as civil rather than criminal, as well as rehabilitative rather than
punitive.35 By removing children from adult criminal court jurisdiction, the
juvenile justice system could supervise and treat children and respond to their
needs with greater flexibility. While the criminal justice system relied on punitive
responses to crime, the juvenile system facilitated the opportunity for juveniles to
reform and become productive citizens.36
The court's rehabilitative focus was based on the assumption that a
juvenile's actions were primarily the function of his or her environment and
therefore did not warrant a punitive response.37 "Reprehensible acts by juveniles
are not deemed the consequence of mature and malevolent choice but of
environmental pressures (or lack of them) or of other forces beyond their control.
[A juvenile delinquent's] conduct is not deemed so blameworthy that
punishment is required to deter him or others."38 The rehabilitative ideal further
rested on the belief that a child's character, not yet fully formed, could
meaningfully be improved by intervention strategies geared to the minor's "best
interests."39
For more than sixty years, the Supreme Court has adhered to the notion that
the law should categorically treat juveniles differently from adults.40 Justice Felix
Frankfurter wrote, "[C]hildren have a very special place in life which law should
reflect. Legal theories and their phrasing in other cases readily lead to fallacious
reasoning if uncritically transferred to determination of a state's duty toward
children."41

33. See Jay D. Blitzman, Gault’s Promise, 9 BARRY L. REV. 67, 67 (2007) (describing original
beneficent purpose of juvenile justice system).
34. See id.
35. See id. at 67.
36. See id.; Gault, 387 U.S. at 15-16.
37. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551–52 (1971).
38. Id. (White, J., concurring).
39. Barry Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court—Part II: Race and the “Crack Down” on
Youth Crime, 84 MINN. L. REV. 327, 337 (1999).
40. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010) (holding that juveniles may not be
sentenced to life without parole for a nonhomicide crime); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574–75
(2005) (sentencing juveniles to death constitutes cruel and unusual punishment); In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1, 28 (1967) (noting that due process protections in juvenile court are compatible with its unique
rehabilitative mission); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 560–61 (1966) (noting that juvenile
proceedings are “non-criminal” in nature); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 55 (1962) (holding that
defendant’s youth was key factor in determining whether confession was obtained in violation of due
process); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948) (holding that defendant’s youth necessitates greater
care by police when obtaining a confession).
41. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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Yet, the rehabilitative function of the juvenile court system is slowly
dissipating. During the 1980s and 1990s the United States experienced a shift in
ideology based on the perception that juvenile crime was increasing.42 The
media's skewed portrayal of juvenile crime ignited public fear, motivating
politicians and lawmakers to respond by proposing "get tough" policies.43
Policymakers moved away from a vision of a rehabilitative justice system toward
one of punitive justice, where accountability and punishment are emphasized
over rehabilitation.44
For example, historically the "best interests of the child" was expressly
articulated as the primary objective of juvenile delinquency proceedings.45 Yet,
today only three states emphasize the best interests of the child as the primary
purpose of juvenile court.46 At least six states have enacted statutes that explicitly
articulate traditional criminal justice goals, such as deterrence, punishment,
accountability, and public safety.47 Sixteen states embrace balanced and
restorative justice principles that emphasize accountability and victim restoration
over rehabilitation.48 A growing majority of states have changed their juvenile
codes to make juvenile delinquency proceedings look more like their adult
criminal counterparts, including such features as the availability of no contest
pleas, blended sentences, parole provisions, fines, and restitution.49 Similarly,
many states have enacted statutory changes eliminating certain long-standing
features of the juvenile system such as limited access to juvenile records, limiting
jurisdiction to age twenty-one, closed courtrooms, and the prohibited use of
juvenile adjudications in subsequent proceedings.50 The widespread elimination
of these characteristics demonstrates the national consensus toward a more
punitive juvenile system.

42. See Tara Kole, Recent Development, Juvenile Offenders, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 231, 234 (2001)
(describing increasing emphasis on punishment in juvenile court system).
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. JOHN C. WATKINS, THE JUVENILE JUSTICE CENTURY: A SOCIOLEGAL COMMENTARY ON
AMERICAN COURTS 45 (Carolina Acad. Press 1998); “The Evolution of Juvenile Courts in the Early
Twentieth Century: Beyond the Myth of Immaculate Construction” in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE, Rosenheim, et al. eds. (University of Chicago Press, 2002) at 43.
46. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600.010 (West 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. Ch. 119, § 53 (LexisNexis
2009); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-1-1 (LexisNexis 2009).
47. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-121h (West 2009); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-1 (LexisNexis
2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-1500 (West 2004); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.01 (LexisNexis 2008);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-201 (2009).
48. ALA. CODE § 12-15-1.1 (2010); ALASKA STAT. § 47.05.060 (2010); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202
(West 2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.02 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-501 (2004);
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-10-2-1 (LexisNexis 2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2301 (West Supp. 2008); MD.
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-802 (LexisNexis 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 242.18 (West 2010);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-102 (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-21 (West Supp. 2009); OR. REV. STAT. §
419C.001 (2009); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6301 (West 2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.010
(West Supp. 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 938.01 (West 2009).
49. Katherine Hunt Federle & Paul Skendelas, Thinking Like a Child: Legal Implications of Recent
Developments in Brain Research for Juvenile Offenders, in Law, MIND AND BRAIN 199, 207–12 (Michael
Freeman & Oliver R. Goodenough, eds., Ashgate 2009).
50. Id.
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As an example, the Illinois Legislature amended its Juvenile Court Act to
make its central goals protection of the public and holding children accountable
for violations of the law.51 This change, according to the Illinois Supreme Court,
represented a "fundamental shift from the singular goal of rehabilitation to
include the overriding concerns of protecting the public and holding juvenile
offenders accountable for violations of the law."52 Amendments to the California
Welfare and Institutions Code have expanded the statutory purpose of juvenile
court beyond "the spiritual, emotional, mental and physical welfare of the minor"
and the securing of "custody, care and discipline" equivalent to that which
parents should provide53 to add a new purpose and powers: protecting the
public from the consequences of criminal activity, authorizing the imposition of
punishment, and redressing injuries to victims.54 Kansas, similarly, explicitly
characterizes the system as dealing with "juvenile crime" and refocused the
primary goals of the juvenile justice code on public safety and accountability in
addition to rehabilitation.55 Moreover, Kansas has incorporated principles of
punishment and accountability—the two basic hallmarks of the adult criminal
justice system—throughout the juvenile system.56
The traditional juvenile justice system historically distinguished itself from
the criminal system by limiting the adverse consequences that typically flow
from criminal convictions. Overwhelmingly, juvenile justice experts suggest that
a finding of delinquency today is not substantially different—as measured by the
51. 1997 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv. 64 (LexisNexis). These same amendments also
added language establishing that minors are entitled to the same procedural protections as adults
unless greater protections are provided by statute. Id. at 65.
52. In re A.G.¸ 195 Ill.2d 313, 317 (Ill. 2001).
53. The 1961 Arnold-Kennick Juvenile Court Law included the following statement of purpose:
“The purpose of this chapter (the Arnold Kennick Juvenile Court law) is to secure for each minor
under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court such care and guidance, preferably in his own home, as
will serve the spiritual, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the best interests of
the State; to preserve and strengthen the minor's family ties whenever possible, removing him from
the custody of his parents only when his welfare or safety and protection of the public cannot be
adequately safeguarded without removal; and, when the minor is removed from his own family, to
secure for him custody, care, and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that which should
have been given by his parents. This chapter shall be liberally construed to carry out these purposes.”
1961 Cal. Stat. 3459, 3460. See also In re Gladys R., 464 P.2d 127, 138 (Cal. 1970) (Burke, J., dissenting)
(“Proceedings in the juvenile court are conducted for the protection and benefit of minors and not to
prosecute them as law violators.”).
54. See 1998 Cal. Stat. 4990l; 1984 Cal. Stat. 2726; 1975 Cal. Stat. 1872; In re Charles C., 284 Cal.
Rptr. 4, 8 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (discussing legislative changes designed to “put an increased emphasis
on punishment”); In re Javier A., 206 Cal. Rptr. 386, 417 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (describing legislation
which added protection of the public to the purposes of the juvenile justice system).
55. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2301 (2010).
56. It has, for example, discarded many of the confidential and protective features of the historic
juvenile court and opened juvenile court proceedings to the general public under a broad array of
circumstances. See, e.g., K.S.A. § 38-1607 (stating court’s official file is available for public inspection
unless the juvenile is under 14 years of age and a judge rules that to open the file would not be in the
best interest of the juvenile); K.S.A. § 38-1608(c) (stating law enforcement files on juveniles at least 14
years of age are subject to the same disclosure restrictions as those of adults). It broadens the scope of
the collateral consequences of an adjudication by explicitly permitting a juvenile’s delinquency
adjudication to be used against him in adult criminal proceedings for the purpose of sentencing
enhancement. K.S.A. § 21-4710; State v. Hitt, 273 Kan. 224 (2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4710 (West
2007) (repealed 2011); State v. Hitt, 42 P.3d 732, 734-35 (Kan. 2002).
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degree of stigma and punishment it confers—from a finding of guilt in a criminal
court.57 And yet, public perception remains that juvenile records are erased or
sealed upon the child reaching the age of majority because many still view
juvenile court as largely rehabilitative.58 As a result, defendants and their
families are less likely to imagine permanent and punitive consequences, and the
failure of an attorney to warn clients of the collateral effects of his or her contact
with the juvenile justice system in turn bears greater injustice.59
In the current landscape of juvenile justice, youths' hearings are becoming
increasingly less confidential and more individuals, agencies, and employers are
using juvenile records against youth in hiring and acceptance policies.60 These
changes in the juvenile justice system coupled with the accessibility of juvenile
record information raise the stakes of a juvenile adjudication calling for a
heightened standard for advising young clients prior to entering an admission.
B.

The weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that juvenile defense
attorneys should inform youth of the collateral consequences of their juvenile
adjudications.

The Padilla Court found that "immigration law can be complex, and is a
legal specialty of its own," resulting in many practicing attorneys being
uninformed of the grave consequences criminal convictions may have on
immigration status.61 The Court nevertheless held that the prevailing weight of
professional norms—specifically the National Legal Aid and Defender
Association Performance Guidelines for Criminal Representation and the
American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice—impose a duty on
counsel to advise the client of the risk of deportation upon criminal conviction.62
Juvenile defense is similarly a specialty. Juvenile law encompasses more
than criminal law. For example, a different body of case law governs motions to
suppress and competency hearings.63 Attorneys must know nomenclature

57. See, e.g., Thomas Grisso, The Competence of Adolescents as Trial Defendants, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 3, 5 (1997) (discussing trend among states to develop laws which extend juvenile
punishment into adulthood); see also Linda E. Frost & Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Mental Health Issues in
Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings, 11 CRIM. JUST. 52, 59 (1996) (“Juvenile delinquency proceedings have
far more serious consequences now than at any other point in the history of the juvenile or family
court.”).
58. Lori M. Nehls, Note, 7 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADV. 91 (2002) (citing Edward Niam, Jr., Do
You Know Who You Are Hiring? Preventing Workplace and Employee Violence, USA TODAY, July 1997, at
51).
59. See Ellen Marrus, Best Interests Equals Zealous Advocacy: A Not So Radical View of Holistic
Representation for Children Accused of Crime, 62 MD. L. REV. 288, 321 (2003) (“In the criminal courts,
relatives and friends are under no illusion as to the consequences of the criminal proceeding. . . . On
the other hand, parents do not always understand what can happen to their children in juvenile
court, because they may view it as a therapeutic institution.”).
60. See Michael Pinard, The Logistical and Ethical Difficulties of Informing Juveniles about the
Collateral Consequences of Adjudications, 6 Nev. L. J. 1111 (2006).
61. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010).
62. Id. at 1482.
63. See Sue Burrell, Juvenile Delinquency: The Case for Specialty Training, CAL. DAILY J., January 14,
2010 (describing separate standards for juveniles for “competence to stand trial, confessions, and
capacity to commit a crime”).
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unheard of in adult court and the services available to clients.64 They must be
able to explain "complex legal principles to their clients in an understandable
way, and assert their clients' expressed wishes even when others would like to
impose their own views of the child's 'best interest.'"65 One commentator has
noted that the representation of juvenile offenders requires specialized skills and
knowledge that appointed counsel accustomed to handling adult cases may not
possess.
Special considerations are necessary when dealing with the attorney-child client
relationship, including: "(1) an understanding [of] child and adolescent
development from a psychological and legal perspective; (2) communication,
consultation and confidentiality issues; (3) issues relating to the child-parent
relationship; and (4) issues regarding the determination of the objectives of the
representation."66

Practice Standards recognize juvenile court practice as a specialty,67 and
those standards, as well as criminal defense standards, support the view that
defense counsel has a duty to inform her client of consequences attendant to an
adjudication or conviction. The American Bar Association advocates a
professional duty to inform clients about collateral consequences: "[to] require
that the defendant is fully informed, before pleading guilty and at sentencing, of
the collateral sanctions applicable to the offense(s) charged."68 The ABA also
advises: "[t]o the extent possible, defense counsel should determine and advise
the defendant, sufficiently in advance of the entry of any plea, as to the possible
collateral consequences that might ensue from entry of the contemplated plea."69
Although the introductory disclaimer "to the extent possible" appears to
downplay the duty, the commentary provides clarification: "[c]ollection of
applicable collateral sanctions pursuant to Standard 19-2.1 will make it possible
for lawyers to give full advice in all cases. Thus, the contingency in Standard 143.2(f) that qualifies defense counsel's duty would no longer pertain."70 Legal
treatises and practitioners' materials, consistent with the ABA Standards, also
consider communication about collateral consequences in evaluating risks and
setting goals with a client to be a norm of competent lawyering.71
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. Joanna S. Markman, In re Gault: a Retrospective in 2007: Is It Working? Can It Work?, 9 BARRY L.
REV. 123, 135 (2007) (quoting Marvin R. Ventrell, Essay, Rights & Duties: An Overview of the AttorneyChild Client Relationship, 26 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 259, 272–73 (1995)).
67. See NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, TEN CORE PRINCIPLES FOR PROVIDING QUALITY
DELINQUENCY REPRESENTATION THROUGH PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEMS (2008), available at
http:// www.njdc.info/pdf/10_Core_Principles_2008.pdf. States have adopted these standards. See,
e.g., JUVENILE DEFENDER ASS’N OF PA., PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR QUALITY AND EFFECTIVE
JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY
REPRESENTATION,
1
(2010),
available
at
http://www.pajuvdefenders.org/file/juvenile_ performance_guidelines.pdf.
68. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY
DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS Standard 19-1.2(a)(iv) (Am. Bar Ass’n 2004).
69. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY Standard 14-3.2(f)(Am. Bar Ass’n,
3d ed. 1999).
70. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY
DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS Standard 19-2.3, 27. (Am. Bar Ass’n 2004).
71. See Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the
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Although there is no clear mandate to inform juvenile clients of collateral
consequences, "notions of fairness and understanding that commentators and bar
associations have urged with regard to notifying adult defendants of these
consequences should naturally extend to the juvenile context," especially in light
of the research suggesting the developmental differences between juveniles and
adults.72 Thus, while the ABA's Juvenile Justice standards do not explicitly
address an obligation to inform juveniles of collateral consequences, the
standards state that "[i]t is appropriate and desirable for counsel to advise the
client concerning the probable success and consequences of adopting any
posture with respect to [delinquency] proceedings." 73 As one youth advocate
comments, an attorney has a duty to "educate children and adolescents on the
short- and long-term consequences of all potential case-related decisions;
patiently lead youth through the pros and cons of each option; and enhance the
youth's ever evolving decision-making skills and capacities."74 That is because
"only defense counsel is in a position to ensure that the defendant is aware of the
full range of consequences that may apply in his or her case"75 and "[w]hether it
is a minor or an adult who stands accused, the lawyer is the one person to whom
society as a whole looks as the protector of the legal rights of that person."76
C.

Defense attorneys have a heightened duty to inform juvenile clients of the
consequences of their adjudications given their clients’ lesser cognitive and
developmental ability.

That juveniles are categorically less mature, less able to weigh risks and
long-term consequences, more vulnerable to external pressures, and more
compliant with authority figures than are adults, necessitates a higher standard
for competent representation.77 In Roper v. Simmons and Graham v. Florida, the
United States Supreme Court recognized that juvenile offenders, whose personal
and developmental attributes sharply distinguish them from adults, should be
spared the harshest adult sentences under the Eighth Amendment to the

Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 701 (2002) (“In this, the ABA Standards are
consistent with other evidence of the norms of competent lawyering, such as legal treatises and
practitioners' materials, all of which emphasize the importance of considering collateral consequences
in evaluating risks and setting goals for criminal litigation.”).
72. Michael Pinard, The Logistical and Ethical Difficulties of Informing Juveniles about the Collateral
Consequences of Adjudications, 6 NEV. L.J 1111, 1111 (2006).
73. JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS: STANDARDS RELATING TO COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE PARTIES
§3.1(b)(ii)[a] (Institute of Judicial Administration-Am. Bar Ass’n eds. 1980)); see also JUVENILE
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES: THE ABA’S SPECIAL REPORT ON BARRIERS TO EMPLOYMENT AND
EDUCATION AS A RESULT OF CONTACT WITH THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2010)
(resolving that records of juvenile adjudications should not be used against juveniles in the pursuit of
employment, education, or financial aid).
74. Kristin Henning, Loyalty, Paternalism, and Rights: Client Counseling Theory and the Role of
Child’s Counsel in Delinquency Cases, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 248–49 (2005).
75. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY Standard § 14-3.2, 126. (Am. Bar
Ass’n, 3d ed.1999).
76. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979) (emphasis added).
77. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005) (holding the death penalty
unconstitutional when applied to minors); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2029–30 (2010) (holding
life imprisonment unconstitutional when applied to minors convicted of non-homicide crimes).
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Constitution.78 Relying on developmental research, the Court concluded that, as
compared to adults, juveniles have a "lack of maturity and an underdeveloped
sense of responsibility," they "are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative
influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure," and their character is
not yet "as well formed as that of an adult."79 More recently in Graham, the Court
reaffirmed the rationale underlying Roper, declaring that "[n]o recent data
provide reason to reconsider the court's observations in Roper about the nature of
juveniles. . . . [D]evelopments in psychology and brain science continue to show
fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds."80
Juveniles engage in present-oriented thinking, which interferes with their
ability to engage in adult-like thinking.81 Generally, adolescents seem unable to
think about the future or they discount the future and weigh more heavily the
short-term risks and benefits from decisions.82 Adolescents are risk-takers who
are more resistant to social control and less susceptible to deterrence.83 Issues of
risk perception are closely related to those of temporal perspective, sometimes
described as future orientation.84 Generally, adolescents tend to focus more on
short-term consequences and less on the long-term impact of a decision or
behavior.85
Adolescents are often characterized as more willing to take risks than adults
and more likely to believe that they will avoid the negative consequences of risky
behavior.86 Not only are adolescents more prone to engage in risky or sensationseeking behavior, but, perhaps just as important, they may have different
perceptions of risk itself.87 For example, adolescents appear to be unaware of
many risks of which adults are aware, and they calculate the probability of
positive and negative consequences differently than adults.88 The proven
inability of juveniles as a class to appreciate the consequences of their actions,
their propensity toward reckless behavior, their immature decision-making and
their susceptibility to negative external influence, warrants different treatment of
children adjudicated delinquent in juvenile court.

78. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578–579; Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2036.
79. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70 (internal quotation marks omitted).
80. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026.
81. See Carl Keane et al., Deterrence and Amplification of Juvenile Delinquency by Police Contact: The
Importance of Gender and Risk-Orientation, 29 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 336, 338 (1989) (“We suggest that
those adolescents who are risk-takers will be more resistant to familial and formal control . . . .”).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal Contexts, 19 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 221, 231 (1995) (“In general, adolescents seem to discount the future more than adults
and to weigh more heavily the short-term consequences of decisions—both risks and benefits—a
response that in some settings contributes to risky behavior.”).
86. See Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment in Adolescence:
Psychosocial Factors in Adolescent Decision Making, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 249, 260 (1996) (“The few
extant comparisons of adults and adolescents suggest that thrill seeking and disinhibition (as
assessed via measures of sensation seeking) may be higher during adolescence than adulthood.”).
87. Id.9
88. Id.
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Teenagers' focus on the present and their inability to weigh long-term
consequences when making important decisions supports the proposition that
attorneys and judges have an increased responsibility to communicate all the
consequences of a juvenile's adjudication of delinquency—both direct and
collateral. Youth do not have the same ability as adults to think through the
consequences of entering into a plea. With an underdeveloped cognitive ability,
juveniles may feel pressured to plead guilty without fully understanding the
consequences that are inevitably in their future.
Furthermore, "[t]eenagers are fairness fanatics."89 While perceived fairness
likely matters to all defendants, adolescents are particularly sensitive to this
issue. If consequences remain uncommunicated it will seem that the system was
wrought with deception and this will in turn foster cynicism and mistrust.90 This
may be especially true when the child is led to plead guilty without all the
information, in a sense feeling tricked by the system and the person appointed as
his advocate.91
II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
A.

Failing to communicate consequences to a juvenile should be deemed ineffective
assistance of counsel.

The Padilla Court held that failing to communicate the very severe
consequence of deportation was deficient representation for purposes of
determining ineffective assistance of counsel.92 Claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel are analyzed under the test established in Strickland v. Washington.93 The
test has two components: deficiency and prejudice. First, a defendant must
establish that his defense attorney's performance was deficient in that "counsel
made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel'
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment."94 Once a defendant
establishes that his counsel's representation was deficient, a defendant must then
demonstrate that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."95
Although the ultimate outcome—adjudication of delinquency—may be the same,
to satisfy the second prong of Strickland, there must be a reasonable

89. Marty Beyer, Juvenile Justice: Juvenile Boot Camps Don't Make Sense, 10 CRIM. JUST. MAG.,
Winter 1996, available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/cjbootcamp.html.
90. See Patricia Puritz & Katayoon Majd, Ensuring Authentic Youth Participation in Delinquency
Cases: Creating a Paradigm for Specialized Juvenile Defense Practice, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 466, 476 (2007)
(arguing that better representation and processes in juvenile proceedings would improve children’s
perceptions of fairness, which will foster respect for the law).
91. Id. (“Children’s perceptions of the fairness of delinquency proceedings can have therapeutic
consequences . . . [P]eople who believe they were treated fairly feel more obligated to obey the law,
and these feelings are sustained over time.”).
92. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 at 1482.
93. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
94. Id. at 687.
95. Id. at 694. The focus of this paper will be on the first prong, demonstrating that failure to
communicate consequences is deficient representation under Strickland. Padilla at 1487.
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determination that but for his counsel's deficiency, the defendant would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.
Because judicial scrutiny of defense counsel's performance is highly
deferential, a defendant must overcome the presumption that the challenged
action or inaction of counsel was the product of sound trial strategy.96 While
Strickland allows for a presumption that counsel's conduct falls "within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance" this presumption implies that
counsel's action or inaction was undertaken in the client's defense.97 In Padilla's
case, his attorney misinformed him that there would likely be no severe
immigration consequences.98 His representation was therefore deemed
deficient.99 Defendants asserting claims for ineffective assistance of counsel for
failing to communicate the consequences of a juvenile adjudication have mostly
been unsuccessful.100
However, those cases can be revisited in light of Padilla. The requirement
that children receive competent representation is more important than ever in
light of the shift toward a more punitive juvenile justice system. Youth who
plead guilty face graver consequences than their predecessors. Moreover, plea
agreements in juvenile court happen at a greater rate than in adult court, so the
obligation to inform juveniles of the consequences of their adjudications should
be further enforced.101 The United States Supreme Court has long recognized the
critical importance of plea negotiation during litigation for purposes of Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.102 In order to enter into a
plea agreement, juveniles must demonstrate they have knowingly, voluntarily,
and intelligently waived their right to proceed at a hearing.103 However, juveniles
enter plea agreements at alarmingly higher rates than their adult counterparts.104
This may be due to their underdeveloped cognitive ability to think through the
consequences of their actions, their misunderstanding of the system and what
possible consequences exist, or familial pressures to dispose of the charge as
quickly as possible. Thus, it is even more important to ensure that juveniles are
fully aware of the consequences they may suffer as a result of entering an
admission.
In Padilla, the Court addressed the issue of the attorney's effectiveness in a
post-conviction proceeding where the defendant collaterally challenged his own
guilty plea.105 In most states, juveniles do not share the same ability to challenge
their guilty pleas. Few states afford juveniles the right to any post-dispositional

96. Id. at 689.
97. Id.; see also People v. Hattery, 488 N.E.2d 513, 517 (Ill. 1985).
98. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 at 1494.
99. Id.
100. See Barbara A. Fedders, Losing Hold of the Guiding Hand: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in
Juvenile Delinquency Representation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 771, 774 (2010).
101. Thomas F. Geraghty, Justice for Children: How Do We Get There? 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
190, 232 (1998).
102. See id at 1486 (2010) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985)); McMann v. Richardson,
397 U.S. 759, 770–71 (1970).
103. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 644-45 (1976); see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 55, 56.
104. Geraghty, supra note 101, at 232.
105. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1475.
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relief. Tennessee, for example, authorizes relief from juvenile orders when the
commitment is void or voidable due to a violation of any right guaranteed by the
state or federal laws or Constitution, or if a right is later recognized and
determined to apply retroactively.106 There is also no time limit for seeking postdispositional relief as long as the juvenile is still in custody and has exhausted
administrative remedies.107 Wisconsin also has a strong post-dispositional relief
system.108 In some cases, juveniles can move for post-dispositional relief before
beginning a traditional appeal.109 Post-dispositional relief can be sought for the
discovery of new evidence, a plea withdrawal, or even a new dispositional
hearing.110 If the result in the post-disposition relief proceeding is unfavorable to
the juvenile, he or she can then appeal the original order or the decision in the
post-disposition relief proceeding.111
In most cases, however, the only avenue a juvenile has to challenge his
adjudication is by appeal.112 For most juveniles, appellate review is meaningless
as it is a lengthy process with no stay of disposition, resulting in the juvenile
spending time in placement serving his disposition while awaiting appeal.113
B.

The obligation to inform juveniles of collateral consequences is greater when severe
consequences attach.

The Padilla Court held that because deportation was such a severe and
automatic consequence that had a lasting impact on the defendant and his
family, it was different from other consequences a criminal defendant may
suffer.114 As discussed earlier, juveniles are ill-equipped to navigate the
complexities of the juvenile justice system and lack the cognitive ability to
understand the grave consequences attendant to their adjudications, and thus
require a heightened standard of representation requiring pre-adjudicatory
warning of collateral consequences. This is even more important when juveniles
face severe consequences to their personal liberty as a result of their juvenile
record. Juveniles adjudicated delinquent for sex offenses can face even graver
consequences than their peers. In many states they can be subject to sex offender
registration and notification statutes and involuntary civil commitment.
i.

Sex Offender Registration and Notification

A potential consequence many juveniles face as a result of a delinquency
adjudication for a sex offense is registration on a public registry. The federal

106. TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-305 (2010).
107. Id.
108. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 938.46 (West 2009).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. §§ 938.46–.47 (providing section 809.30 applies to motions for post-dispositional relief
brought by juveniles); Telephone Interview with Eileen Hirsch, Assistant State Pub. Defender in the
Wis. State Public Defender’s Madison Appellate Office (Feb. 11, 2010).
112. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
113. Wendy N. Davis, Town Without Pity, 95 A.B.A. J. 50, 53-54 (Sept. 2009).
114. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 at 1481-1483.
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Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 specifically mandates
juveniles are to be included in sex offender registries.115 According to the Adam
Walsh Act, all states must "substantially comply" with the Sex Offender
Registration & Notification Act (SORNA) requirements of the Walsh Act or risk
forfeiting ten percent of the funds normally received from the federal Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.116 Under the mandate of SORNA, Tier II or
Tier III classification could result in registration for twenty-five years to life,117
and require in-person "show-ups" two to three times each year.118 Failing to
register can subject the person to a maximum term of imprisonment greater than
one year.119
Registration pursuant to SORNA can result in restrictions on the
individual's residency, employment, and higher education. For example,
adjudications may disqualify juveniles from obtaining public housing.120
Housing authorities routinely conduct background checks for adult applicants
and may "investigate whether any member of the family unit, including a
juvenile member, has been convicted of specific disqualifying offenses."121 While
juvenile records can often be inaccessible, "[t]here is evidence that some housing
authorities attempt to screen for juvenile records despite state laws that limit or
deny access."122 Juveniles adjudicated delinquent for sexual offenses who are
required to register as sex offenders may have their housing options limited by
community notification provisions.123 Sex offenders subject to community
notification requirements may often find themselves with limited, undesirable
housing options when community members mobilize to prevent registered sex
offenders from moving into their neighborhoods.124 Furthermore, a minor trying
to readjust to normal life will experience extreme hardship because registration
makes their name, picture and offense available to the public, including to their
classmates and the press via the internet.125
Using the reasoning set forth by the Supreme Court in Padilla, the
consequence of sex offender registration is severe and should trigger the duty to
inform the juvenile. A case decided years before Padilla virtually mirrors its
application. In State v. Edwards, a case involving an adult sex offender, the New
Mexico Appellate Court noted that ABA Standards recommended advice of
collateral consequences, particularly in the context of immigration
proceedings.126 The court continued to note that it "see[s] no reason why the
115. § 111, 42 U.S.C.A. § 16911 (West Supp. 2010).
116. Id. § 125, § 16925(a).
117. 42 U.S.C.A. § 16915.
118. Id. § 16916.
119. Id. § 16913(e).
120. See Kristin Henning, Eroding Confidentiality in Delinquency Proceedings: Should Schools and
Public Housing Authorities be Notified?, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 563–76 (2004).
121. Pinard, supra note 60, at 1114.
122. Henning, supra note 120, at 570.
123. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 16921 (West 2009).
124. Moms Fight Back Against Sex Offenders, available at http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/
AmericanFamily/story?id=2943449&page=1.
125. WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 16918, 16920 (West 2009).
126. State v. Edwards, 2007-NMCA-43, 141 N.M. 491, 157 P.3d 56, 59, 63 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007)
(citing State v. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, 136 N.M. 533, 101 P.3d 799 (N.M. 2004)). In Edwards, the
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similarly harsh consequences of sex offender registration should not also
necessitate specific advice from counsel so that defendants can make informed
decisions regarding their pleas."127 Moreover, the Washington Supreme Court
squarely held that a juvenile's plea was involuntary when he was misinformed
by his attorney that his juvenile sex offense conviction could be removed from
his record.128 Although the court did not specifically hold the attorney was
ineffective for failing to inform the juvenile of the consequence of sex offender
registration, the court held that the plea was rendered involuntarily because the
juvenile was not fully informed of the registration consequence.129 The court
concluded that although the registration obligation did not affect the immediate
sentence, the impact is "significant, certain, and known before a guilty plea is
entered."130 A New Jersey court also applied Padilla in finding that a juvenile
should have been warned of Megan's Law consequences because those
consequences are especially important.131
A Georgia court applied Padilla's framework to the requirements of the
state's sex offender registration system.132 One of the factors the court relied upon
was that "prevailing professional norms" supported counsel advising their clients
of potential collateral consequences of pleas, including specifically sex offender
registration.133 It also considered the nearly automatic result of sex offender
registration.134 The court found that the sex offender registration is a "drastic
measure."135 Finally, the court ruled that the terms of the statute at issue were
"succinct, clear, and explicit."136 In ruling that the attorney must advise as to the
consequence of sex offender registration, the court also provided guidance as to
which practical factors may be determined as essential by the courts.137 Certainly,
if the adult sex offender registration statutes in these cases meet the Padilla
standards, SORNA too will require a duty to inform juvenile clients as to its
consequences.

court held that the adult defendant could have his guilty plea set aside because counsel failed to
sufficiently advise him that sex offender registration was a virtually certain consequence of his plea
and, thus, performed deficiently.
127. Id.
128. See State v. A.N.J., 225 P.3d 956, 970–71 (Wash. 2010).
129. Id. at 971.
130. Id. at 968.
131. In re C.P.H., No. A-0936-08T4, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. Lexis 1721, at *16 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. July 23, 2010).
132. Taylor v. State, 698 S.E.2d 384, 388 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010). In Taylor, the court held that counsel
performed deficiently when he failed to advise the adult defendant that pleading guilty to a child
molestation charge would require him to comply with requirements of Georgia’s sex offender
registry statute program.
133. Id. (relying on ABA and NLADA standards).
134. Id.
135. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
136. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
137. Id.
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ii. Pennsylvania Involuntary Civil Commitment
Another potential consequence for juveniles adjudicated delinquent of sex
offenses is involuntary civil commitment for an indeterminate period.138
Pennsylvania is the only state in the country that provides for involuntary
commitment of juvenile sex offenders without a similar requirement for adult sex
offenders.139 In Pennsylvania, Act 21 authorizes involuntary civil commitment
for "sexually violent delinquent children who, due to a mental abnormality or
personality disorder, have serious difficulty in controlling sexually violent
behavior and thereby pose a danger to the public and further provides for
additional periods of commitment for involuntary treatment for said persons."140
Act 21 has three requirements. First, the juvenile must have been adjudicated
delinquent for an act of sexual violence, including rape, involuntary deviate
sexual intercourse, sexual assault, aggravated indecent assault, indecent assault,
or incest.141 Second, he must be committed to a facility and remain there when he
turns twenty years old.142 Finally, the Sexual Offender Assessment Board makes
a determination that he is in "need of involuntary treatment due to a mental
abnormality or personality disorder which results in serious difficulty in
controlling sexually violent behavior that makes the person likely to engage in an
act of sexual violence."143 Civil commitment can last from one year to life.144
According to In the Interest of A.C., the Pennsylvania Superior Court found
that Act 21 has a non-punitive purpose and effect.145 It relied primarily on the
burden of proof—clear and convincing evidence—in the Act 21 hearings.146
Decided sixteen days before Padilla was issued, this case did not specifically
address whether counsel or the court must advise the defendant about possible
Act 21 consequences.147 Therefore, it is instructive to look at a post-Padilla case.
138. See, e.g., WASH REV. CODE § 71.09.030 (West Supp. 2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02 et seq.
(West 2010); WIS. STAT. § 980.02(2)(C) (WEST 2010); MASS. G.L. C. 123A PART I, TITLE XVII, CHAP. 123A §
1 et seq. (West 2010); 725 ILCS 207/1 et seq.(WEST 2010).
139. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6401 (West 2010).
140. Id.
141. Id. § 6403(a)(1).
142. Id. § 6403(a)(2); In re K.A.P., 916 A.2d 1152, 1158 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007), aff’d, 934 A.2d 262 (Pa.
2007). The court in K.A.P. held, despite the plain reading of section 6403, which refers to section 6352,
that the institution or facility should not be literally meant as a juvenile facility, but as any facility,
including an adult correctional institution. 916 A.2d at 1158.
143. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6403(a)(3) (West 2010). For a discussion of the dangers of the
science of this determination, see Robert Prentky et al., Sexually Violent Predators in the Courtroom, 12
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 357, 369 (2006).
144. Legal Consequences of Juvenile Sex Offense Adjudications: Involuntary Civil Commitment and
Registration & Notification, prepared by Nicole Pittman, Esq., Juvenile Justice Policy Analyst Attorney,
Defender Association of Philadelphia; Rich Cholodofsky & Richard Gazarik, Pittsburgh TribuneReview, June, 7, 2007 (“Although commitments are to last a maximum of one year, there is no limit to
the number of times a person can be committed.”).
145. 991 A.2d 884, 893 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010); see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6401 (West Supp.
2010).
146. Id.
147. Id.
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In Commonwealth v. Abraham, the Pennsylvania Superior Court found that a
defendant who pleaded guilty to offenses that resulted in a loss of his vested
pension should have been fully advised of such consequences.148 Although the
court found that that the loss of pension is punitive, it applied Padilla.149 It held
that the loss of pension is "automatic and inevitable, the stakes are high and the
consequences are succinct, clear and distinct."150 It also noted that only criminal
behavior triggers forfeiture, so it is intimately connected to the criminal process,
similar to deportation.151
Applying Abraham and Padilla to Act 21, it is clear that Act 21 is intimately
connected to the criminal process. Not only are specific offenses required to
trigger Act 21, but the juvenile must still be placed at the time the commitment
review process begins.152 The stakes are undoubtedly high. A person can be
involuntarily committed from one year to his entire life.153 His freedom is taken
away, and the only measure of process is a review every year.154 This would
certainly surpass juvenile court's jurisdiction that expires at age twenty-one.155 It
may also surpass the maximum sentence for any of the enumerated offenses if
the defendant had been arrested as an adult.156 In fact, Act 21 penalties easily
could be considered harsher for juveniles than adults; in Pennsylvania, only
juveniles are subject to indefinite, involuntary commitment.157
The only question in applying Padilla and the Pennsylvania Superior Court's
interpretation of it to Act 21 is whether Act 21 penalties are automatic. The
Sexual Offender Assessment Board must first make a determination, so at the
time of the defendant's admission or finding of guilt it is not yet known whether
he would be committed under Act 21. However, it is quite simple to advise based
simply on the offense that the client could possibly be Act 21 eligible. Applying
the logic in Padilla, an attorney must, at a minimum, advise that there are adverse
consequences. Because of the severity of the consequence and because the
consequences are "succinct, clear, and distinct," Act 21 consequences are no
different than deportation consequences or, certainly, losing a vested pension.

148. 996 A.2d 1090, 1094–95 (Pa. Super. 2010), cert. granted, 9 A.3d 1133 (Pa. 2010).
149. Id. at 1094–95; Id. at 1092 (“Under Padilla, it is unclear if the direct/collateral analysis is still
viable. That analysis might still be useful if the nature of the action is not as ‘intimately connected’ to
the criminal process as deportation.”).
150. Abraham, 996 A.2d at 1095.
151. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 at 1094-95.
152. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6403(a).
153. See Pittman, supra note 144; 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6401 (West Supp. 2010).
154. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6404.
155. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6302 (West Supp. 2010) (defining a “child” as a person under
the age of 18 or a person under the age of 21 years who committed an act of delinquency before
reaching the age of 18 years).
156. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1103 (West 1998); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9714 (West 2007)
(specifying the maximum penalties for most adult offenses); but see Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346,
368–69 (1997) (ruling that Kansas’ adult involuntary commitment statute did not violate the
Constitution’s double jeopardy prohibition).
157. In re K.A.P., 916 A.2d 1152, 1162 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (holding that the appellant’s equal
protection claim failed but acknowledging that no such commitment existed for similar adult
offenders).
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III. THE AFFIRMATIVE DUTY OF DEFENSE ATTORNEYS AND JUDGES
There are obvious challenges to fulfilling an ethical duty to inform. It may
be difficult to know what the collateral consequences are in a particular
jurisdiction. "[T]he collection of consequences that can attach to a single
conviction is exceedingly difficult to grasp, as they comprise a mixture of federal
and state statutory law, regulatory law and local policies."158
Yet, even with perfect information, systemic barriers hinder lawyers from
fulfilling their duty to inform of collateral consequences. When juveniles are
represented, a lack of resources and time constraints often leave children's
lawyers overburdened and ill-prepared to provide adequate representation.159
Many juvenile attorneys handle enormous caseloads and cannot devote sufficient
time to each case.160 Attorneys may not be appointed until late in the process,
and through no fault of their own may not even meet their clients until moments
before a hearing.161 Thus, "[t]he priority becomes resolving cases quickly, with
the overwhelming majority of children pleading guilty."162
Prior to adjudication and during the adjudicatory hearing itself, the defense
attorney's hands are often tied in terms of negotiating a disposition. Issues that
would be aggressively litigated before a jury with the presentation of experts—
the likelihood of a false confession or the reliability of an eyewitness, for
example—may be seen by the juvenile court as a waste of time and resources, as
the court may feel it has heard it all before and can judge those things on its
own.163 Sensing the futility of such arguments, attorneys may not even pursue
investigation or the appointment of experts that would be routinely sought in
adult criminal proceedings.164
Furthermore, "many attorneys who recognize their proper role are stymied
by the pressures to cooperate and hostility on the part of the court toward the
adversarial process."165 For example, often there is pressure to plead as the easiest
way to access services. "Particularly for children of color, the juvenile justice
system has become the de facto mental health system because of a lack of
community-based treatment programs to address mental health needs."166 This
might make information about collateral punishments seem less relevant,
especially if a child has no meaningful alternative but to accept these
consequences as the price of ensuring their current well-being through key

158. Pinard, supra note 60, at 1119.
159. See Katayoon Majd & Patricia Puritz, The Cost of Justice: How Low-Income Youth Continue to
Pay the Price of Failing Indigent Defense Systems, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 543, 559–60 (2009).
160. Puritz & Majd, supra note 90, at 470. See also Jerry R. Foxhoven, Effective Assistance of Counsel:
Quality Representation For Juveniles Is Still Illusory, 9 BARRY L. REV. 99, 120–21 (2007).
161. Puritz & Majd, supra note 90, at 470.
162. Id.
163. See generally Steven A. Drizin & Greg Luloff, Are Juvenile Courts a Breeding Ground for
Wrongful Conviction?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 257 (2007).
164. National Juvenile Defender Center, State Assessments, http://www.njdc.info/
assessments.php (last visited Apr. 28, 2008); see also ABA Juvenile Justice Ctr. & Mid-Atl. Juvenile
Defender Ctr., Maryland: An Assessment of Access to Counsel and Quality of Representation in Delinquency
Proceedings, 31 (2003), available at http:// www.njdc.info/pdf/mdreport.pdf.
165. Purtiz & Majd, supra note 90, at 470.
166. Id. at 471.
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services and interventions. Yet, this desire to connect children with services
actually amplifies the importance of relaying the punitive ramifications of what
superficially may seem like an acceptable solution to a child's problems.
In order to facilitate a meaningful duty to inform, the very role of the
juvenile defender needs to re-imagined. One solution is to create specialized
juvenile defense units and restructure the provision of services.167 Through better
training, attorneys will be equipped to discuss collateral consequences with their
clients. For example, the Juvenile Defender Delinquency Notebook provides a
manual for defenders that also outlines professional responsibility standards.168
Similarly, the ABA has called for legislatures to compile information about their
jurisdiction's criminal code into an easily navigable resource.169 And, in
Pennsylvania, the Juvenile Indigent Defense Action Network recently issued a
Collateral Consequences Checklist to better inform attorneys of the consequences
attendant to a juvenile adjudication of delinquency.170 Making the dispersal of
this information easier may be particularly helpful to over-burdened attorneys.
Yet, even an affirmative duty to inform may not be sufficient in helping
youth who waive their right to counsel before any opportunity to be advised of
collateral consequences.171 "Studies report that more than one-half of children
accused of criminal acts appear in juvenile court without counsel and enter pleas
to crimes they may or may not have committed."172 While the waiver of counsel
by juveniles presents a distinct dilemma, the importance of communicating
collateral consequences provides an additional argument for prohibiting such
waivers, and perhaps establishing an unwaivable right to counsel.173
Requiring judges to instruct on collateral consequences in the colloquy
arguably would provide a procedural safeguard to ensuring the dispersal of
information. Moreover, this may be the only way to warn juveniles if loose
attorney waiver provisions are in place. In fact, ABA guidelines advocate judicial
warnings stating that, "[t]he judge should separately advise youth in open court
of the conduct with which they are charged, the rights they are relinquishing, the
167. See id. at 477.
168. ELIZABETH CALVIN ET AL., JUVENILE DEFENDER DELINQUINCY NOTEBOOK 14–17 (2d ed. 2006),
available at www.njdc.info/pdf/delinquency_notebook.pdf.
169. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY
DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS STANDARD § 19-2.1(Am. Bar Ass’n Criminal Justice
Standards Comm. 2004).
170. PENNSYLVANIA JUVENILE INDIGENT DEFENSE ACTION NETWORK, THE PENNSYLVANIA JUVENILE
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES CHECKLIST 2 (2010), available at http://www.pajuvdefenders.org/file/
checklist.pdf.
171. See Pinard, supra note 60, at 1116 (“[T]rial judges do not render defendants’ pleas unknowing
by failing to inform the defendants of collateral consequences when either accepting pleas or
pronouncing sentences.”). In Boykin v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held that the constitution requires
that a guilty plea be entered voluntarily and knowingly to be valid. 395 U.S. 238, 242–43 (1969).
Arguably, pleading to a juvenile adjudication without knowing the future punitive consequences
cannot be considered “knowingly” or “intelligent.” However, this argument meets the same fate as
ineffective counsel claims. Just as an attorney’s failure to inform her client of collateral consequence is
not ineffective assistance of counsel, a trial judge’s failure to inform the defendant when accepting a
guilty plea does not render the plea “unknowing.” Pinard, supra note 60, at 1115–16.
172. Mary Berkheiser, The Fiction of Juvenile Right to Counsel: Waiver in the Juvenile Courts, 54 FLA.
L. REV. 577, 580 (2002).
173. Id. at 642–49.
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possible sentence and other consequences of such a plea, including collateral
consequences."174
If it is the professional duty of the attorney to advise clients in advance of
any pleas or trial and if judges are warning defendants in open court, there are
more protections to ensure defendants understand their rights as well as the
exceptionally serious consequences. A colloquy is just one way to standardize
such warnings and make certain that juveniles are being given accurate advice,
no matter their jurisdiction.
Although SORNA has not yet been adopted in Pennsylvania, the Juvenile
Court Judges' Commission released a model colloquy in response to the probable
enactment of SORNA in the Commonwealth.175 The background memorandum
states that the colloquy may be modified for each jurisdiction and will have to be
modified once SORNA is enacted in Pennsylvania.176 The memorandum also
states that "it is recommended that courts utilize the attached SORNA
colloquy . . . prior to accepting an admission in any case that meets" specified
criteria.177 The colloquy itself is designed for the attorney to review with the
client.178 It is a four page form that includes explanation as well as signatures by
the juvenile, parent, and attorney.179
In Padilla, the Court described immigration law as, at times, "complex."180
But the Court also found that counsel could have easily looked up the
consequences of Padilla's plea and thus advised him correctly.181 A colloquy like
the one proposed by the Juvenile Court Judges' Commission in Pennsylvania
could both educate attorneys who would otherwise be unsure of these
consequences and give them the resources to find the right advice. In turn, the
trial court provides a check to make certain that the colloquy is reviewed and the
juvenile understands what it contains. There is little difference between SORNA
and the immigration consequences of Padilla. The colloquy is one way to ensure
judges and attorneys provide the proper advice on these exceptionally serious
consequences.

174. YOUTH IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: GUIDELINES FOR POLICYMAKERS AND PRACTITIONERS
18 (AM. BAR ASS’N CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, TASK FORCE ON YOUTH IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYS.
2001) (emphasis added). Even in a jurisdiction where the state Supreme Court has ruled that courts
are not required to advise about consequences, specifically sex offender registration, the court stated,
“[I]t is clearly better practice for a trial court to advise a defendant that a consequence of pleading
guilty to an offense requiring sex offender registration is that the defendant must register as a sex
offender, and we encourage trial courts in Tennessee to make every effort to ensure that defendants
are so advised prior to entering a guilty plea.” Ward v. Tennessee, 315 S.W.3d 461, 472 (Tenn. 2010).
175. See
SORNA COLLOQUY
(Juvenile
Court
Judges’
Comm’n
2008),
http://
www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_152425_404264_0_0_18/sorna_colloq
uy_final_draft_10-6-08.doc.
176. Memorandum from James E. Anderson, Exec. Dir., Juvenile Court Judges’ Comm’n to
Juvenile Court Judges and Chief Juvenile Prob. Officers 2 (Oct. 10, 2008), http://
www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_152425_404263_0_0_18/10-1008_background_correspondence.pdf.
177. Id. at 1.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010).
181. Id.
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CONCLUSION
Juvenile defense attorneys already have a difficult responsibility to
shoulder—youth are more impetuous and less likely to consider the
consequences of their adjudications even when informed simply because it is a
future consequence. However, that merely makes the duty to inform juveniles
stronger. As youth are unable to comprehend the devastating effects that
collateral consequences may have on their future, it is the responsibility of their
attorneys to inform them of those repercussions, and to do so before the youth
admit to wrongdoing. The Supreme Court in Padilla has made clear that the
direct versus collateral distinction fades when dealing with grave risks, such as
deportation. Juveniles deserve the same protection for the consequences they
may suffer. By finding counsel ineffective when they fail to warn their young
clients of the consequences of their adjudications, attorneys are held accountable,
ensuring a participatory and informed process.

